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Abstract 
This thesis has investigated whether species other than humans would feel emotionally 
committed to honesty, and if they would feel this commitment towards other species. We have 
used data from a wide variety of sources, including comparative, behavioural, and neural 
studies, computational analyses, and mathematical and theoretical works. We have found that 
our neural circuitry predispose animals towards discounting temporally distant benefits, thus 
favouring cheating in public goods problems. In humans, this has been fixed with an emotional 
reaction against dishonest behaviour. We discuss several mechanisms which may have 
promoted cooperation in similarly advanced species, and also which factors could influence 
cooperation between different species. We conclude that cooperation is likely to have evolved 
in species advanced enough for civilisation, but that interspecies cooperation is likely to face 
significant challenges. 
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Introduction 
Cooperation is an integral part of society, whether among humans, ants, or anything in 
between (Doebeli & Hauert, 2005). However, with cooperation arises the possibility of 
cheating, of not upholding one’s end of the bargain. Cheating occurs in microorganisms 
(Crespi, 2001; Strassman, Zhu, & Queller, 2000), insects and plants (Dicke & Sabelis, 1992), 
jay birds (Stephens, McLinn, & Stevens, 2002), simple software programs (Yamada & Sakama, 
2013), and, of course, humans (e.g. Frank, 1988), to name a few. Taken at a glance, cheating 
often seems to be more profitable for the individual in terms of short-term fitness, but at a cost 
to cooperative, and thus societal, function. How can cheating exist in, but not pervade, a 
species?  
To investigate cheating and its place in nature, we ask the following questions, put 
somewhat to the extreme: If aliens stepped out of a saucer tomorrow, could we expect them to 
have an emotional commitment to honesty? And if yes, how confident could we be that they 
would feel this commitment towards us? In other words, how general is commitment to honesty 
in sufficiently advanced species, and could we expect this to apply between species and 
cultures?  
To answer this, we first need to figure out how we can make any predictions about the 
behaviour of alien life forms. Countless movies, novels, and games have tried, but more often 
than not, it boils down to variations over human psychology, often used as a commentary on 
society. While we cannot fault writers their portrayal, we can try to answer the question without 
resorting to anthropomorphising. One approach that springs to mind would be to examine 
behaviour across species and cultures. 
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Comparison 
Between species 
A good place to start comparing behaviour is the closest relatives of humans, the 
simians. Brosnan et al. (2011) found that economic behaviour, highly relevant for cooperation, 
was surprisingly similar across humans, chimpanzees, and capuchin monkeys. They found that 
the differences between the groups were due mostly to the proportion of individuals who used 
similar decision-making processes. This means that there were rational capuchin monkeys, but 
fewer than rational chimpanzees, and even fewer compared to humans. This means that 
economic/rational behaviour exists on a continuum in and between species, and not just in 
humans.   
Wrangham and Peterson’s 1996 book, Demonic Males, traced violence in humans all 
the way back to the great apes (orangutans, gorillas, chimpanzees and bonobos), and argued 
that humans are violent because evolution has selected for violence. However, using the 
relatively peaceful Bonobo as evidence, the authors show that our shared genetic heritage did 
not necessarily doom us to violence. While their findings discuss violence, one would assume 
the same holds for economic conduct as well, that related species does not necessarily share 
behaviour. Similarly, Stevens, Hallinan, and Hauser (2005) found a striking differences in the 
ability to discount future payoff for a smaller, immediate payoff differed in two closely related 
primates (common marmoset and cotton-top tamarin). The authors argued that this is because 
of the animals’ different environments.  
For our argument, one of the lessons to take from Demonic Males and Stevens, 
Hallinan, and Hauser’s paper is that while ancestral genetic makeup undoubtedly affects the 
psyche, significant variations occur in closely related species, and that the environment is a 
powerful factor in even fundamental cognition. This warns us that comparison across species 
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might be an inconclusive approach. This is not to say that the approach is useless, but rather 
that additional methodologies are needed to provide supplementary evidence. How about 
comparison within species? Let us look at culture.  
Between cultures 
 Before the British colonisation, the Nayar of Kerala, India, led unconventional family 
lives. The men traditionally worked as mercenaries, which meant that they would be away for 
long periods at a time, if they returned at all. While the men usually married, it was both 
common and accepted for the wives to take lovers, making it difficult, if not impossible, to tell 
if their wife’s children were their own. In a very pragmatic tradition, the men would invest in 
their sisters’ offspring rather than their wives’, that is, investing in the highest average genetic 
relatedness. When the British unified India, regional wars abated, and the need for mercenaries 
declined. Within a generation, the mating system changed to more conventional norms (Gough, 
1961). 
The Nayar were an exception to the rule of patriliny, inheritance via the male line. In 
their case, this was because of paternal uncertainty. There are other examples of matriliny, or 
female line inheritance, although they are vanishing with increasing economic development 
(Holden, Sear, & Mace, 2002). However, these examples do not rely solely on paternal 
uncertainty, but rather on whether the resources benefit sons or daughters the most. In 
horticultural societies, where matrilineality is prevalent, raiding is not a great concern. This 
means that strong fighters unencumbered by children are not in great demand, and sons and 
daughters are valued the same. Since the paternal linear is uncertain compared to the maternal, 
these societies tend to practice matrilineal inheritance. When societies turn to cattle farming, 
both raiding and defence from raiding becomes an issue, so sons in general becomes more 
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highly valued. This offsets the paternal uncertainty, and patrilineal or mixed decent becomes 
the norm (Holden & Mace, 2003).  
While not directly related to cooperation, the traditional Nayar mating pattern shows us 
that, when compared to the traditional western or modern Nayar pattern, significant differences 
in behaviour can occur within a species. The same is true for tribes practicing matrilineal 
inheritance. Although this variability does not bode well for generalisation, it is interesting that 
these patterns can be predicted using game theory. If cultural difference can be predicted 
mathematically, then we would have a much more robust base upon which to build our case. 
Let us apply game theory to cooperation.   
  
AN HONEST INVASION: A STUDY OF COOPERATION 6 
 
 
  
AN HONEST INVASION: A STUDY OF COOPERATION 7 
 
Game Theory 
Game theory is the mathematical exploration of rational decision-making. It was 
originally developed by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in 1944 as a means to 
predict trends and behaviours in economics. Game theorists looked at specific situations, called 
games, where agents (known as players) would interact to gain some sort of reward. The agents 
can play one or several different strategies, that is, behave in one way or another. Game 
theorists analyse the situation to find the optimal strategy in each game (Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy).  
Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) was developed somewhat later. Maynard Smith 
wrote Evolution and the theory of games in 1982, which is considered the seminal work of 
EGT. EGT applies game theory in a biological setting, but with several unique qualifiers. First, 
the agents are genes, not individual animals. Second, a strategy isn’t chosen by the agent, it 
evolves by trial and error over many generations (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) 
Equilibrium 
 In any game, there are different outcomes. Some outcomes favour one player over the 
other, others distribute payoff equally. Some outcomes are only possible if both players play 
optimally, but deciding optimal play is not just looking at the best possible outcome. A Nash 
Equilibrium is when neither player in a game have an incentive to change the strategy they are 
currently employing, given their opponent’s choice of strategy. This means that if you think 
your opponent is playing the best response to your strategy, then you should play the best 
response against his strategy. 
Prisoner’s dilemma 
 Common (or public) goods problems are a category of games where all players, if only 
interested in maximising their economic benefit, reaps the greatest profit by defecting, i.e. 
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refusing to contribute to the common good, taking more than their share, or outright theft. 
However, if players attempt to maximise profit, they end up with less than if they had 
cooperated. Suppose there are ten families that share enough land to sustain ten cows. If one 
family adds another cow, all eleven cows will be slightly undernourished, yet the family with 
two cows does better by having two-elevenths, compared to the other families’ one-elevenths. 
If the other families follow suit by adding their own extra cow, then they are all worse off than 
if they only had one cow each. Still, any family that goes back to keeping one cow will be even 
worse off. Other real world examples of this includes overfishing or generating power in a way 
that hurts the planet. (R. Biegler, personal communication, April 30, 2015). The prisoner’s 
dilemma is a widely researched two player version of this game. Frank (1988) has explained 
the scenario like this: 
Smith and Jones run a restaurant together, Smith being the cook and Jones being the 
manager. Since Jones can’t cook, Smith can easily use second rate ingredients and pocket the 
difference. Likewise, Jones can siphon off money as “management expenditures”, with Smith 
being none the wiser. If they both cooperate, the restaurant goes well, and they both get 3 
monetary units. If one of them cheats, the cheater gets 5 units and the honest one gets zero. If 
they both cheat, they both get 1 units, because the restaurant isn’t going so well. We assume 
they only agreed to work together for one season (one round of the game). 
Smith benefits from cheating, no matter whether Jones cheats or cooperates.  So if Jones 
cooperates, Smith gets 5 for cheating, but only 3 for cooperating.  If Jones cheats, Smith gets 
1 for cheating, but only 0 for cooperating.  No matter what Jones does, Smith gets more for 
cheating.  The same is true for Jones, so both should cheat if they want to maximise profit, yet 
then they end up getting 1 each instead of 3 each. This makes cheating the Nash equilibrium if 
the game is played only once.  
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Prisoner’s dilemma can exist either as a one-shot game, where the players only interact 
once, or as an iterated game, where the players interact repeatedly. The iterated version allows 
us to look at long-term gains of strategies. Additionally, iteration offers us the possibility of 
cooperation as an adaptive strategy, compared to the depressive mutual defection that is the 
Nash equilibrium of one-shot game.  
Tit-for-Tat 
There have been suggested several different strategies for optimal play in iterated 
prisoner’s dilemma. The arguably most famous strategy, Tit-for-Tat, was presented by Anatol 
Rapoport in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma tournament held by Robert Axelrod (Axelrod, 
1980). The contestants wrote a computer program, which was paired against the other 
contestants programs. TFT won the tournament by getting the most points, but it was also 
remarkable for having very few and simple instructions compared to the other contestants. The 
strategy goes as follows: Start by cooperating, then copy the opponent’s choice for each 
consecutive round. In other words, if I defect on you, you defect on me until I start cooperating. 
This ensures that both players get approximately the same score.  
  Smith 
  Defect Cooperate 
Jo
n
es
 
Defect 
Both: 1 
Jones: 5 
Smith: 0 
Cooperate Smith: 5 
Jones: 0 
Both: 3 
Table 1: Gain matrix for prisoner’s dilemma. 
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Let us run some simulations. We use the same payoff matrix as earlier (Table 1) and 
set the number or interactions to 100, then compare outcomes for the different strategies.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Gain matrix for different strategies. 
TFT = Tit-for-Tat, D = Always Defect, C = Always Cooperate 
We see here that while TFT loses by a slight amount when playing with a constant 
defector (because of the first round), the benefits of using TFT is evident when playing either 
against TFT or a constant cooperator. As in the one-shot game, defectors have a solid advantage 
over cooperators. 
It seems like the iterated game is very similar to the one-shot, in that defectors and 
cooperators receive the same payoffs as in one-shot games. What makes iterated games special 
is that they allow for memory, which is crucial to TFT. TFT only needs memory for what 
another player did when encountered the last time, because TFT simply copies the other’s 
behaviour from last time but ignores anything in the more distant past.  
 To simulate the invasion of a strategy into a population, we can graph the percentage 
of TFT and constant defectors in a population. If we also specify how many interactions they 
would have with each other, an important feature of TFT appears.  
  Player 2 
  TFT D C 
P
la
y
er
 1
 
TFT 1: 300 
2: 300 - - 
D 1 : 104 
2: 99 
1: 100 
2: 100 - 
C 1: 300 
2: 300 
1: 0 
2: 500 
1: 300 
2: 300 
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Figure 1: TFT versus constant defectors over 50 rounds of interactions, and with different 
ratios of defectors in the population. 
 
Figure 2: Same as figure 1, but with 10 rounds of interactions. 
 
As we can see, the fewer rounds of interactions there are, the harder it is for TFT to 
invade a population of defectors. TFT loses out in the first round, and fewer interactions before 
switching means more first rounds. If players using TFT could know beforehand if they were 
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up against a defector, then this would make TFT a much stronger strategy. We need a way to 
recognise individuals and remember their actions. We need reputation. 
Reputation 
We have seen that TFT only solidly beats constant defectors when there are numerous 
interactions before a switch. Another way in which TFT could gain the upper hand, is if a 
player’s reputation precedes them. Of course, TFT with reputation is not simple TFT anymore, 
since we are expanding the game into more complex territories. Reputation gives defectors a 
penalty, in that it increases the chance that future interactions will result in low payoffs. If they 
are known defectors, then players should defect automatically. If we also add the option of 
avoiding interaction with unsavoury characters altogether, and assuming avoidance does not 
come at the cost of losing out on an interaction, then that would make TFT even more 
outstanding. Reputation gives TFT its edge, in that not only will they always play fair, they 
will also punish defection by reciprocating the move.  
Spectators 
In order for reputation to favour cooperation, however, it is required that other people 
see how nice or naughty you have been. This is usually not a problem, as your co-player 
presumable would spread the word to their group, or there would be spectators of some kind. 
There is evidence that spectators influence actions among less advanced species. 
Dzieweczynski and colleagues found that Siamese fighting fish will alter their behaviour 
dependent on the audience (Dzieweczynski, Earley, Green, & Rowland, 2005). Baltz and Clark 
(1997) found that male budgerigars, a socially monogamous bird, would refrain from cheating 
on their partners if there were flock-mates present, but do so when there was no-one to watch 
the infidelity.  
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An interesting discovery was made by Bateson, Nettle and Roberts (2006), who found 
that pictures of eyes would increase honesty compared to pictures of other things. They set up 
the experiment at an “honesty box” in a university coffee room, in essence an unmanned hot 
drinks stations with a price list and donation box, and no-one to watch whether the staff and 
PhD students actually paid for the drinks. The researchers found that when pictures of eyes that 
looked directly at the participants were displayed, they paid almost three times as much as 
when pictures of flowers were displayed. Such results indicate that reputation does matter. 
Image scoring  
Related to reputation is image scoring, a type of indirect reciprocity. This is a proposed 
mechanism that allows organisms to cooperate in one shot games without being worse off than 
if it had defected (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998). The idea is that you have an image, or a 
reputation, and that not cheating increases the value of your image. Someone who uses image 
scoring will cooperate with another player if that player’s image score, the proportion of past 
interactions in which that player was known to cooperate with others, exceeds a threshold 
value.  As a consequence, even if the image scorer is exploited, those who observed the 
interaction will increase their image score for that person and be more likely to help in future.  
The evolutionary value of image scoring is greatly increased by language, which 
facilitates transmission of your image beyond eye-witnesses. While Nowak and Sigmund only 
performed computer simulations, Wedekind and Milinski (2000) found the same effect in live 
humans. It also appears that image scoring, or something similar, can exist in more primitive 
species. Pinto, Oates, Grutter, and Bshary (2011) have observed that cleaner fish cheat less in 
the presence of potential clients, and that clients shun cleaner fish that cheats. 
Implementing reputation seems like a magic bullet for defection. Why cheat at all, when 
the long-term costs are so high? First of all, while TFT only requires an exceedingly simple 
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behavioural blueprint in theory, this may not be the case for the mechanisms of reputation. 
Reputation requires memory, individual recognition, and either spectators or communication. 
Of these, individual recognition is presumably the latest development, as it requires both 
communication and memory to function. Individual recognition, while fairly common in 
vertebrates, is rare among invertebrate species (Caldwell, 1986), suggesting it is a relatively 
advanced feature (Tibbetts & Dale, 2007), or at least more rare than cooperation, which occurs 
in microorganisms (e.g. Crespi, 2001). So, while invertebrates could still find cheating a viable 
option, reputation may even the balance in evolutionary younger species.  
Golden opportunities  
Humans are a curious species with regard to cheating. Frank (1988) brought up the 
puzzling fact that most of us will not cheat even when there is no-one to watch us. His example 
is picking up an abandoned wallet full of cash in a deserted park. To use our already established 
terms, taking it counts as defection, giving it to the police is cooperation, receiving a reward is 
co-player cooperation, and leaving empty-handed is co-player defection. Game theory predicts 
that the only rational choice in this situation is to defect, after all, the potential reward for 
turning in the wallet is neither immediate nor as good as taking the contents. All the same, the 
wallet is usually ignored or returned (Frank, 1988). Indirect reciprocity cannot account for this 
choice, as there are no witnesses, and so no incentive for cooperation.  
Emotional commitment to honesty. Frank (1988) have proposed a mechanism for 
why this happens. He called it emotional commitment to honesty, and it is basically an extra 
layer of protection against cheating. When the temptation of a large, immediate payoff rears its 
ugly head, an emotional reaction, a feeling of shame or guilt, quickly balances the scales, 
helping us focus on the long-term benefit. To understand why we need this mechanism, 
however, we need to look at temporal discounting. 
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Temporal discounting 
It is a curious fact of animal cognition that short-term rewards are much more potent than equal, 
or even greater, long-term rewards. This preference for immediate rewards compared to 
temporally distant ones is called temporal discounting, and lack of preference follows a steep 
hyperbolic curve (Green, Myerson & McFadden, 1997). This means that as the reward’s delay 
increases, the value of the reward steeply drops, until it gradually levels off as the delay gets 
longer. This is similar, but not identical to an exponential curve.  
 
 
Figure 3: Hyperbolic versus exponential discounting. 
 
We see plenty of examples of temporal discounting in nature, even among relatively 
advanced species. Dufour, Pelé, Sterck and Thierry (2007) found that chimpanzees could 
postpone a reward for 4 minutes if the delayed reward item was 2 to 8 times larger than the 
immediate reward. They could also postpone the reward for 8 minutes if it was 40 times larger. 
Similar experiments have been done to capuchin monkeys (Ramseyer, Dufour, Pelé, Chauvin 
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& Thierry, 2005) and preschool human children (Mischel, Shoda & Rodriguez, 1989), with 
human children doing comparably well, about 5 minutes maximum reward delay, and the 
capuchins doing as much as 24 times worse than the chimpanzees. Rachlin, Raineri and Cross 
(1991) found that human adults, on the other hand, can delay rewards for months or even years.  
Multiple explanations for temporal discounting have been presented. These 
explanations can be related to this thesis through game theory. However, it is important to note 
that temporal discounting is not exclusive to this field. Temporal discounting is relevant for the 
behavioural sciences as a whole, and it is not required that there are multiple agents, like in 
games. We will be using game theoretic examples, since this is more relevant to the thesis as a 
whole. 
As mentioned, there are several different explanations for temporal discounting. We 
will present these based on Stephens’ (2002) two categories: Collection-risk discounting and 
opportunity-cost discounting.  
Collection-risk  
This first class of explanation holds that delayed rewards are less valuable because 
delay reduces the likelihood that the reward is obtained. This can further be divided into two 
subtypes, if one supposes a sequence of reward collections. The subtypes are identical if one 
only considers a single collection event. Termination risk is where something might occur that 
terminates the sequence before the delayed reward can be collected, and the sequence cannot 
be resumed. In cooperative game terms, this could entail something happening that prevents 
collecting the benefits of cooperation, making cheating, i.e. getting the immediate reward, a 
safer option.  
Interruptions risk is closely related, but here the game sequence is not terminated, so 
you only have the risk of losing one reward. There is still the opportunity of getting the next 
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reward in the sequence. It differs from termination risk in that the games continue even if one 
player cheats, there is no punishment other than maybe reducing the cheated player’s incentive 
to play nice. Collection-risk could mediate how much consecutive games are valued in 
scenarios with or without punishment or reputation.  
Opportunity-cost 
This class deals with scenarios where waiting has a cost associated with loss of 
opportunity elsewhere. One type, called rate cost of delay, asserts that since you cannot utilise 
two sources of benefit at once, then you lose or gain the difference in benefit between the 
sources. This can be exemplified by a predator waiting in ambush at a certain spot. This 
prevents the predator from trying another ambush spot if the first one is unproductive, since it 
cannot wait in two places at the same time. Likewise, playing with a defector means you cannot 
be playing with a cooperator, and thus lose the difference.  
The second type embodies investment, where waiting for a better opportunity prevents 
you from utilising and increasing resources now. This can be exemplified by an animal 
conserving energy by forgoing smaller prey for something larger. Hunting the smaller prey 
might tire you to the point where the larger prey can escape, but waiting for the larger prey will 
also drain energy, albeit at a slower pace. From a cooperative game perspective, this would 
entail turning down potential co-players, i.e. known defectors, in favour of the right type of 
player, i.e. known cooperators. Not playing is worse than playing, as you can always guarantee 
a small payoff.  
Short-term rewards 
Temporal discounting will often lead to smaller rewards being chosen, even when the 
long-term average payoff of choosing the larger reward is greater. In cooperation situations, 
cheating is this smaller, immediate reward, while cooperating is the larger, but distant, reward. 
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We can exemplify this with reputation. In populations where reputation is present, cheating 
gives you less chance of interacting with someone after you have cheated them, thus less 
potential long-term payoff. However, the initial round gives you a large payoff if your partner 
cooperates. If you discount the future payoff from repeated interactions, and likewise discount 
the trouble cheating is likely to cause you in the future, then cheating becomes an 
overwhelmingly tempting option. This way, temporal discounting makes cooperation difficult, 
as the long-term rewards of cooperation, and costs of cheating, are reduced to negligible 
amounts. If temporal discounting rules, cheating should prevail.  
Stephens, McLinn, and Stevens (2002) tried to reduce temporal discounting in 
cooperation games with blue jays. They found that, compared to conditions with normal 
discounting, reduced discounting promoted cooperation to a high degree. In fact, cooperation 
did not match the rate prescribed by conventional strategies, but exceeded it. The birds forgave 
defection close to 50 % of the time, compared to the 10 % of Generous TFT, a very good 
“forgiving” strategy in simulations (Nowak & Sigmund, 1992).  
Stephens (2002) have suggested that animals’ tendency to choose short-term rewards 
over long-term rewards might not be a bad choice after all. Long-term rewards are more 
obscured by random events than are short-term rewards, making it harder to be sure of the 
actual size of the reward. Put differently, the animal can be surer of actually getting the short-
term reward, since a lot of things might happen between now and the future. However, in a 
cooperation game, and resource gathering in general, this myopic focus may not be as 
beneficial. In fact, Stephens et al. (2002) found no experimental evidence of animal cooperation 
in prisoner’s dilemma up to date.  
Fixing the problem. Despite some positive features, temporal discounting is not 
perfect. If it was perfectly tuned to the environment in such a way that the best long-term payoff 
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were chosen, then we would have no need for an emotional commitment to honesty (Frank, 
1988). Yet we do need it, and so temporal discounting must be flawed in some way. If the only 
function of emotional commitment to honesty is to enable cooperation, then we would term it 
a patch, or quick fix. There is precedent for evolutionary quick fixes in nature, as, for example, 
the selection for sickle cells in response to malaria can attest to (Wade, 2006). On the other 
hand, why would evolution not fix the problem by removing temporal discounting instead? 
One answer to this could be that temporal discounting is a manifestation of a more fundamental 
mechanism. 
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Neural Coding 
Ratio comparison 
Stephens (2002) have argued that temporal discounting reflects the way the brain 
compares and discriminates magnitudes. Ratio comparison appears to be preferred in neural 
systems (Stephens, 2002; Gibbon, Malapani, Dale, & Gallistel, 1997). The alternative to ratio 
comparison would be difference comparison, but Stephens (2002) have shown mathematically 
that, unlike ratio comparison, difference comparison is insensitive to time. We can explain it 
like this: 
 If animals compared different sources of food by subtractively comparing the time it 
would take to obtain it (e.g. 12 seconds is 2 seconds longer than 10 seconds), then the amount 
of time compared would not matter. The difference between 10 and 12 seconds would be the 
same as the difference between 100 and 102 seconds, and discrimination would be just as easy 
in both cases.  However, if the animal uses the ratio between time intervals to discriminate, 
then the difference between 10 and 12 would be 1.2, and 1.02 between 100 and 102. We see 
experimentally that if the magnitude of the time intervals compared is large, then animals 
cannot accurately judge the difference between them, unlike the same interval of smaller 
magnitudes. 
Stephens (2002) proposed that the tendency towards ratio comparison might either 
reflect a mechanistic restraint, or an unknown adaptive advantage. The two most influential 
theories on neural coding, logarithmic and linear coding, offer different insights on this. 
Logarithmic coding holds that ratio comparison happens because stimuli is coded 
logarithmically, which makes values at larger magnitudes less distinct. Linear coding, on the 
other hand, assumes the differentiation problems happens as a result of noise in the system. 
This is important, as the difference between logarithms is a ratio, making ratio comparison a 
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direct consequence of the neural coding scheme. Linear coding, on the other hand, can be 
subtractively compared, making ratio comparison not the only option. Since temporal 
discounting appears to be based on ratio comparison, then an evolutionary workaround could 
be to use difference comparison to avoid discounting future rewards.  
Neural representation 
The brain encounters large dynamic ranges every day. It needs to represent millimetres 
and kilometres, milliseconds and hours, tones ranging from 10 to 20 000 Hertz, and so on. One 
way to solve this problem could be by having a single neuron represent each distinguishable 
stimulus, much in the same way that the heavily criticised “grandmother cell” theories have 
proposed (e.g. Bower, 2009). There are, however, alternative approaches to neural 
representation of stimuli.  
The Weber-Fechner law. In the middle of the 19th century, Ernst Weber discovered 
that the ability to differentiate between two magnitudes depended on their intensity. If the 
magnitudes were small, e.g. two unequal feathers, he found that subjects could easily 
distinguish between their weights. If the magnitudes were larger, however, greater difference 
between the objects were needed to make differentiating possible. His student, Gustav Fechner, 
later developed this relationship into a logarithmic equation, P = k ln (s), where P is perceived 
intensity, k is a constant (the Weber fraction), and s is the stimulus intensity (Dehaene, 2003). 
This equation is known today as the Weber-Fechner law.  
A century later, Stevens (1961) would propose that the perceived intensity was a power 
function of the stimulus, rather than the logarithm. However, MacKay (1963) would quickly 
claim that Steven’s law and the Weber-Fechner law is indistinguishable without examining the 
underlying architecture. In the same year, Mountcastle and colleagues would argue that 
psychophysical laws are linear (Mountcastle, Poggio & Werner, 1963). This set the scene for 
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a debate that rages to this day, whether neural representation of stimulus is linear, or 
logarithmic. There are variations over these themes, but we will for the present purpose 
examine them in a more general way.  
Logarithmic. Logarithmic representation means that each neuron fires in response to 
a specific range of numbers (or frequencies, temperatures, pressure, etc.). For example, in a 
base 10-system, neuron 1 fires when the stimulus is in the range of 1-9, neuron 2 fires during 
10-99, The higher the number, the larger the range of the firing neuron, which equals less 
precision. This would make the Weber-Fechner law a feature, as a limited range of neurons can 
code for a large range of objective stimuli (Gallistel, 2011). 
Linear. In a linear coding scheme, neurons encode stimuli as linearly proportional to 
the subjective representation. The imprecision embodied by the Weber-Fechner law is 
explained as noise introduced at a later stage (e.g. in memory encoding or retrieval), thus 
making the law an unintended consequence, a bug. A linear system would need some clever 
mechanism to encode large dynamic ranges, as the amount of dedicated neurons needed would 
be enormous (one per discrete quantity) (Gallistel, 2011).   
Logarithmic coding does not have a specific, unifying model associated with it. 
Dehaene and Changeux (1993) have proposed a model, and Sun, Wang, Goyal, and Varshney 
(2012) have made a computational analysis, but on the whole, proponents of log coding appear 
to have mostly focused on whether data fit a logarithmic or linear plot, rather than theory-
crafting. Linear coding, on the other hand, is primarily represented by Scalar Expectancy 
Theory. 
Scalar expectancy theory. A prominent theory in linear coding is Scalar Expectancy 
Theory (SET). Proposed by Gibbon (1977), SET postulates an internal clock mechanism, 
containing a pace- maker which generates pulses, an accumulator which counts these pulses, 
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and long-term memory, which saves the counts when the interval has ended (e.g. reward 
received). There is also a decision mechanism, which compares current time with remembered 
time, and identifies an appropriate response outcome (Gibbon et al., 1997). SET has scalar 
properties, meaning that the standard deviation of time, or noise, grow as a constant fraction of 
the mean.  
Accumulator models such as SET function like a stopwatch, keeping time from the start 
of an interval to the reward at the end. A problem with this is how the animal knows when the 
interval starts. It would require an absurdly large number of “stopwatches” to record the 
beginning of every potentially interesting interval (Kheifets, 2014).  
Time-left. The time-left procedure has been an important experiment for proponents of 
SET (e.g. Wearden and Jones, 2007; Gibbon and Church, 1981)). The procedure consists of 
two levers, one which gives rewards every X (e.g. 60) seconds, and one every Y (e.g. 30) 
seconds. The lever with the most frequent rewards (Y) are only available after a certain time, 
T, which is varied by the experimenter. The experiment aims to discover when the animal 
thinks that both levers are equally likely to produce the reward when pressed, which is expected 
to measure the animal’s subjective time measurement.  
 Gibbon and Church (1981) used the time-left procedure to find evidence of temporal 
subtraction in rats and pigeons, and used these findings to argue that subjective time is 
represented linearly, not logarithmically. However, the experimental setup used, the time-left 
procedure, has been criticised by Cerutti and Staddon (2004) for being too complex to settle 
the question. They proposed that the temporal control hypothesis (a variant of temporal 
discounting) provides a simpler explanation of the results. Castro and Machado (2010) used an 
improved version of the time-left procedure and found that the results are compatible with 
logarithmic representation, but also with linear representation with bias. It would seem the 
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time-left procedure is unable to provide conclusive evidence for either coding scheme, and so 
cannot be used to decide which of them is more likely. 
Source of variability. Logarithmic coding has variability built in at the time when the 
external input is received and translated into neural code. The variability is inherent in the 
coding from the very beginning. SET and other scalar models (Gibbon, Church & Meck, 1984; 
Gallistel & Gelman, 2000; Brannon et al., 2001) place the source of variability in memory, 
rather than stimulus encoding. However, Allan (2002) and Rodríguez-Gironés and Kacelnik 
(2001) claimed that memory is an unlikely candidate for variability.  
Generalisability across modalities 
The research on linear versus logarithmic representation is spread out across many 
sensory modalities. If these modalities could be shown to have a collective underlying 
mechanism, then we would have a large amount of data to compare, and perhaps finally have 
the means to put the debate to rest.  
Space and time are closely related. Physicists treat time as a fourth dimension to the 
three spatial dimensions we normally perceive. Quantities are non-abstract numbers that are 
given to sets that exist in space (and time). Stevens (1960) coined the term “prothetic” to mean 
dimensions that can be experienced as “more than” or “less than”. There are, as we will see, 
grounds to assume that these quantities are closely linked in the mind as well, and that they 
may share a common mechanism.  
Gallistel (2011) have argued that time, space, and number are interrelated. 
Representation of rate, for example, is numerosity divided by duration, and spatial density is 
numerosity divided by area. Thus, it is plausible that the system used to represent these 
magnitudes share a common mechanism.  
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Walsh (2003) has proposed a unifying theory of magnitudes (ATOM), where 
perception of time, numbers, and space are based on a common system. Walsh’s model has 
space, time, and quantity all be computed by a single metric. ATOM does not assume either 
clock or non-clock explanations for underlying mechanisms (Bueti & Walsh, 2009), and is 
therefore valid for both logarithmic and linear representation schemes. 
Staddon and Higa (1999) have proposed a model, multiple-time-scale (MTS), which 
explains the close relation between timing and counting. Staddon and Higa (2006) argued that 
the MTS model does not postulate any specialised timing process, thus having the advantage 
of fewer assumptions.  
Brannon, Suanda, and Libertus (2007) have found experimental evidence that argues 
for a parallel development of time and number representation in children. This makes it likely 
that they share an underlying mechanism, or at least are closely related. Research on 
developmental dyscalculia also support this connection, but there appears to be a degree of 
independence as well (Cappelletti, Freeman & Butterworth, 2011). Skagerlund & Träff (2014) 
argued that their data on dyscalculia goes well with ATOM (Walsh, 2003). 
Mackevicius, Best, Saal, and Bensmaia (2012) have argued that tactile, vibrissal, and 
auditory systems all rely on temporal information and are all similar in function.  
This is not to say that all aspects of the world are encoded similarly. For example, much 
research has been done on grid cells and their role in encoding position (Moser et al., 2014), 
but grid cells might be working on a higher level of abstraction than time, space, and number 
perception. Bueti and Walsh (2009) have made it clear that the ATOM model does not support 
all aspects of time and space, and cited navigation as one of the exceptions.  
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Nieder and Miller (2003) have presented data that supports the analog coding 
hypothesis, the view that both higher-level cognitive functions and lower-level sensory 
functions have fundamentally similar representations, and should exhibit similar attributes. 
Nieder and Miller’s results also point to both cognitive and sensory systems having the same 
underlying architecture and coding system. This is plausible, as evolution would seek to reuse 
designs (Nieder & Miller, 2003).  
While not conclusive, these data suggest rather than confirm a common underlying 
mechanism to at least the basic dimensions of time, space, and number. This gives us a broader 
foundation upon which to build our case.  
Logarithmic or linear coding? 
Numerosity. Neural representation of numbers have received much attention in the 
logarithmic versus linear debate. A very interesting pattern emerges when looking at 
representation of numbers in different populations. In young children, uneducated adults, and 
non-human animals, numbers appear to be represented logarithmically (Nieder & Miller, 2003; 
Dehaene, 2003; Dehaene, Izard, Spelke, & Pica, 2008; Roberts, 2006). In educated adults and 
older children, however, representation appears to be linear (Sielger & Booth, 2004; Dehaene 
et al., 2008). Linear representation of numbers become gradually more prominent as children 
age, and for a while, both logarithmic and linear representation are present (Lasik & Siegler, 
2007). Note that by “educated” we mean “educated according to western standards”. This 
change in number representation has been attributed to culture (Dehaene et al., 2008; Ansari, 
2008).  
While linear representation of numbers are found among humans, it appears to be a 
later addition via invention or culture. Evolution appears to favour logarithmic coding of this 
aspect of space-time.  
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Time. Roberts (2006) have found that pigeons’ time scale support a logarithmic 
framework. Yi (2009) criticised Roberts’ conclusion on the grounds that they made 
unnecessary assumptions, but supported logarithmic coding in rats, using signal detection 
theory. Signal detection theory assumes only that the strength of sensory and cognitive events 
are continuously variable (Macmillan, 2002).  
Wearden and Jones (2007) have found time perception to be linear in educated adults. 
They used the time-left procedure, which has been criticised earlier. They claim, however, that 
the criticism do not apply to their version of the procedure. Yi (2009) also criticised Wearden 
and Jones, and claimed that their averaging process made their results less valid. Cordes, King, 
and Gallistel (2007) also used the time-left procedure when they found evidence of linear 
representation in mice. This may or may not discount the results entirely, but does at the very 
least cast some doubt as to their validity. 
Van Rijn and Taatgen (2008) argued for a logarithmic representation of time, with a 
single time-keeping mechanism. This is interesting because other pace-maker models usually 
support linear time (e.g. Mech and Church, 1983). Van Rijn and Taatgen (2008) also found 
that strategic use of arithmetic negated the need for more clocks. However, while Crystal 
(2001) seem to agree with the logarithmic representation, he argued that the underlying 
mechanism must be based on oscillators, not pace-makers. Crystal (2006) have presented an 
oscillator model for discrimination of temporal intervals, ranging from milliseconds to days.  
While no consensus has been reach regarding the underlying mechanism for timing, be 
it clocks or oscillators, it seems that logarithmic representation is a viable coding scheme 
regardless of mechanism, and that the majority of authors support this. 
Other modalities. Johnson, Hsiao, and Yoshioka (2002) have used data from texture 
perception to argue that linearity, rather than logarithmicity, is the basic law of psychophysics. 
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However, Shirado and Maeno (2005) found that human texture perception has a logarithmic 
relationship with objective stimuli. Nieder and Miller (2003) did not see the conclusion of 
Johnson et al. (2002) as incompatible with logarithmic coding. After the initial logarithmic 
encoding, signals could be communicated in a linear fashion throughout the brain. 
Sun et al. (2012) have shown that sound perception follows a logarithmic scale. This 
matches how we denote sound intensity, as the decibel scale is logarithmic (Encyclopædia 
Britannica). While decibel notation might be logarithmic primarily out of convenience and 
clarity, it is a potentially interesting parallel.  
Varshney and Sun (2013) claim that, while the majority of sensory representation 
appear to be logarithmic, there are exceptions, night vision being one of them. Research into 
deviations from the norm could prove to give us a broader understanding of the strengths and 
weaknesses of different sensory coding schemes.  
Computational analysis. In addition to examining how the empirical data fit either 
representation, some authors have approached the problem with mathematical modelling. 
Portugal and Svaiter (2011) have formally shown that the logarithmic scale provides the 
minimal worst-case relative error. They assume that relative error is more important in nature 
than absolute error, and thus that the system that minimises relative error is biologically most 
feasible. Sun et al. (2012) argue that Portugal and Svaiter’s (2011) focus on worst case error is 
flawed, and that expected relative error is more biologically plausible. However, while 
disagreeing with the method, Sun et al. also found that logarithmic and related representations 
are optimal for evolution. 
Alternatives 
We have primarily focused on logarithmic versus linear coding thus far. There are other 
proposed mechanisms, but since existing research mainly discuss linear or logarithmic systems. 
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It is beyond the scope of this paper to compare all the contending mechanisms at the level of 
scrutiny required to reach a definitive answer, but we will mention these newcomers in the 
hopes that more thorough investigations can be instigated.   
Autoscaling. Gallistel (2011) has proposed an alternative scheme for the representation 
of magnitudes. Autoscaling is a mechanism where sensitivity is automatically adjusted based 
on the strength of the input, so that weak input is more accurately measured than stronger input. 
This is a feature we find in many measuring instruments. An advantage of this is that the output 
signal strength is independent of input strength, thus avoiding sensory overload. This 
mechanism would make the Weber-Fechner law a feature, not a bug. 
Modulo coding. Modulo representation is a number representation system where 
numbers “wrap around” when reaching a certain value. An example would be a 12 hour clock, 
which, upon reaching 12, starts again at 0. Adding 5 to 9 in this system would result in 2, not 
14. This clock is modulo 12.  
Fiete, Burak, and Brookings (2008) compared different representation schemes in terms 
of capacity, ability to perform algorithmic operation without a look-up table, and more. They 
found modulo coding to be theoretically superior to the alternatives. However, the system lacks 
the ability to directly compare different magnitudes. A possible solution presented by Fiete et 
al. (2008) involves a mechanism that converts modulo phase to metric representation. The 
authors have constructed a neural network scheme that converts modulo code into linear code, 
but were troubled by the number of neurons required for the linear output. They speculated 
whether a similar conversion scheme could produce a more efficient output, like logarithmic 
code, but they did not present one. Since ratio comparison appears to be a fundamental process 
in the brain, this conversion might be necessary. This does add a step that other coding schemes 
avoid, giving some doubt to its value. However, modulo coding has other valuable features, 
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and there is no reason to believe that the brain is one hundred percent optimised in every aspect. 
More research is required on this promising framework. 
The verdict 
The literature on neural coding is immense, and going into the mathematical details of 
proofs would take more time and effort than can be spared for this thesis. Therefore, a literature 
review has been attempted instead. While logarithmic representation emerges as a plausible 
candidate for sensory coding from the literature reviewed, it is also an old framework with 
much work behind. Newer frameworks have yet to receive as much attention, skewing the 
review somewhat. This also highlights that there might be other frameworks, not yet thought 
of, that provide an even better fit. However, based on the data and theory available, logarithmic 
coding prevails.  
If the fundamental coding of sensory input is logarithmic, and differences between 
logarithms is a ratio, then this might be the mechanistic restraint Stephens (2002) proposed. 
This means that the brain cannot help but use ratio comparison, and further cannot help discount 
temporally. This makes the emotional commitment to honesty an easier fix than changing 
sensory encoding at the neural level.  
Commitment? 
Now, how does this help us answer whether aliens would feel emotional commitment 
to honesty? So far, we know that logarithmic encoding of stimuli is a viable system for 
advanced lifeforms. We know that, according to Sun et al. (2012) and Portugal and Svaiter 
(2011), it should be favoured by evolution. We know that because of this coding scheme, 
evolution ran into the problem of temporal discounting. This is bad for cooperation and long-
term benefits, as immediate rewards get prioritised. We know that in our case, evolution fixed 
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this problem by implementing a quick fix, the emotional commitment to honesty, since it could 
not fix the underlying architecture.  
So, according to our line of argumentation, humanity’s ability to cooperate with each 
other is in part due to an evolutionary patch. Thus, our odds of meeting cooperative aliens 
would depend on how strong the selection pressure for logarithmic coding is, constraints on 
their neural substrate, their evolutionary history, and whether there are alternative patches for 
temporal discounting. However, we have only discussed the emotional drive towards 
cooperation, not the rational drive towards maximum gain and future benefits. This emotional 
commitment to honesty may only have needed to help us past short-sightedness and into the 
stage where rationality prevails. While researchers have found that human economic rationality 
often leaves much to be desired (e.g. De Martino, Kumaran, Seymour & Dolan, 2006), we 
cannot discount hyper-rationality in spacefaring civilisations. Whether this bodes good or bad 
for us, is another matter. 
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Rationality and cooperation 
If aliens were hyper-rational, i.e. that they always choose the strategy that gives the 
maximum reward and least risk, which strategy would they chose? Earlier, we examined Tit-
for-Tat and found that it can reliably beat constant defectors. However, much research has been 
done one the subject of optimal strategies, and the superiority of unmodified TFT has been 
challenged.  
Generous TFT  
A slight modification of TFT is Generous TFT, where opponents are forgiven 10 % of 
the time. Nowak and Sigmund (1992) have shown that Generous TFT gives slightly better 
results than pure TFT. The authors have also stressed that TFT needs to be in use by a small 
fraction of the population for it to take hold. This will in turn pave way for the generous version 
of TFT.   
Dugatkin and Alfieri (1991) have shown that Guppies exhibit TFT-like behaviour. 
Moreover, they also appear to remember defectors and cooperators over at least 4 hours, giving 
some credence to a reputation system. The authors have also pointed out that this preferential 
treatment given to cooperators may help TFT gain the necessary foothold in a population.  
Pavlov 
Another strategy was presented by Nowak and Sigmund (1993). Named Pavlov, the 
strategy reminds one of reflex-like behaviour: If you win, you keep playing your last move, if 
you lose, you change behaviour. Win-stay, lose-shift. Winning is defined by cooperating with 
a cooperator, or defection against a cooperator. Conversely, losing is cooperating with a 
defector, or defecting against a defector. The authors have argued that Pavlov is better than 
TFT because it can correct occasional mistakes, and also exploit unconditional cooperators. 
This last feature prevents the unconditional cooperation strategy that invite defectors into the 
AN HONEST INVASION: A STUDY OF COOPERATION 34 
 
population. However, Pavlov will be heavily exploited by unconditional defectors, as Pavlov 
will cooperate every other turn. 
The Pavlov strategy is superior to Generous TFT only if both players act at the same 
time. Sequential acting may be more realistic in a natural environment, in which case Generous 
TFT is better. Pavlov can only be efficient in sequential games if longer memory is utilised 
(Nowak & Sigmund, 1994). Wedekin and Milinski (1996) tested students on simultaneous and 
sequential prisoner’s dilemma, and found that Generous TFT did better in the sequential games, 
while a Pavlov-like strategy did best in simultaneous play, as predicted. While the games were 
organised so that only the last round was displayed, thus ideally making it a memory-one game, 
it is possible that the students used longer memory when playing. Press and Dyson (2012) have 
shown that memory greater than one shouldn’t provide an advantage in simultaneous play, but 
they make no such claim for sequential play. 
Since Pavlov is claimed to be a manifestation of win-stay, lose-shift, which is widely 
seen among animals, one would expect to see it in cooperation games as well. This appears not 
to be the case. One reason why might be that while Pavlov classifies both cooperating with a 
cooperator and defection against a cooperator as wins, animals might consider only temporally 
close rewards as wins, as per temporal discounting. This may lead to classifying game theoretic 
losses as wins, because the rewards were immediate, and likewise theoretical wins as losses 
(Clements and Stephens, 1995). In other words, we don’t see Pavlov in nature because our 
“win” conditions may not be the animals’ “win” conditions, since temporal discounting makes 
immediate wins more desirable.  
Zero-determinant  
A new class of strategies was recently discovered by Press and Dyson (2012), called 
Zero-determinant (ZD). They have the ability to force a linear relationship between the player’s 
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own score and that of the opponent, making the player able to control the long-term payoffs 
for both players. This is achieved by assigning probabilities to the various responses, so that, 
for instance, cooperation is met by defection with a certain probability. There are many 
different strategies in this class, including the much older strategy TFT, which forces the 
opponents score to be equal to the player’s own. Another interesting ZD strategy is extortion, 
where the more you let yourself be taken advantage of, the better you will score. If you wish 
to punish the extorter, you have to do so at a cost to yourself.  
Of particular note is a subset of strategies called generous ZD (Stewart & Plotkin, 2013; 
Akin, 2012). These strategies forgive opponents’ defection, but not too often. Stewart and 
Plotkin (2013) have shown that generous ZD strategies are able to outplay most other strategies, 
even earlier champions like TFT or Pavlov, in addition to less generous ZD strategies.  
However, for the generous ZD strategies to be successful, they require that the 
population isn’t too small. Extortion strategies dominate the smaller populations (between two 
and ten agents, depending on parameters). Adami and Hintze (2013) have argued against the 
evolutionary stability of ZD strategies, and have claimed that mutations of ZD strategies are 
unlikely to be ZD themselves. However, a 2014 corrigendum clarifies that they referred to a 
coercive subset of strategies, like those described by Press and Dyson (2012). Adami and 
Hintze has conceded that the generous ZD strategies described in Stewart and Plotkin (2013) 
are evolutionary stable, able to exist in a population without being outperformed by invading 
strategies. Zero-determinant strategies are still a fresh find, and so animal models are scare, if 
not non-existent.  
Memory-one  
All these strategies for simultaneous iterated prisoner’s dilemma have in common that 
they only use information gathered in the previous round. Press and Dyson (2012) have proved 
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that longer memory does not proffer any advantages, in that a player with a good memory-one 
strategy effectively sets the rules of the game. However, this does not mean that longer memory 
is irrelevant in cooperation, only that theoretically effective strategies need not bother with it. 
Longer memory is interesting as reputation, i.e. using information from earlier games, might 
be one way to ensure cooperation. It is important to note that Press and Dyson’s proof is only 
valid for two-player simultaneous play, while Nowak and Sigmund (1994) was discussing 
sequential play when arguing that longer memory was required for the success of Pavlov.  
It is worth noting that the research so far has been analysing two-player iterate 
prisoner’s dilemma. Work has been done on n-player games, where n is greater than 2, and 
where each player’s payoff depends on the payoff of n-1 other players. Needless to say, this 
quickly gets complicated, so this thesis have only focused on two players at a time. An 
interesting point about n-player games is that a longer memory appears to be important for 
winning (Li & Kendall, 2014). While complicated in regards to model-making, n-player games 
may be prevalent in nature. If memory equals reputation, then Li and Kendall’s finding 
emphasises the importance of reputation.   
Since longer memory isn’t required, simpler organisms may have evolved these 
strategies more easily, thus increasing the probability of finding ZD strategies in nature. TFT 
and Pavlov have exceedingly simple instructions, further giving credence to their universality. 
ZD strategies contain probabilities of performing certain actions, which may or may not be as 
easily encoded. However, Webb and Dorris (2013) have proposed a neural model where 
probabilities can be implemented.  
If these strategies are available to simple beings, then they are surely available to our 
hyper-rational alien friends. This is generally good for us, as these strategies typically goes for 
mutual cooperation, and will even forgive transgressions now and then. While there are some 
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less virtuous strategies in the ZD-class, the generous strategies have been proven to outperform 
these (Stewart and Plotkin, 2013). Constant defection is also not among the optimal strategies, 
giving further reassurance of rational beings’ cooperativeness.   
Bounded rationality 
Between relying on hardwired neural preferences and hyper-rationality in deciding how 
to act, our aliens might behave closer to our standards of rationality, called bounded rationality. 
This model assumes humans act rational within the confines of available information, cognitive 
capacity, and time (Simon, 1955). This is different from hyper-rationality in that factors like 
stress (Van den Bos, Hartevelt & Stoop, 2009), glycogen stores (Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007), 
assorted biases (e.g. Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), etc., influence the choice.  
A form of bounded rationality is a likely if the aliens have evolved from very simple 
organisms, since evolution would presumably not evolve a perfectly rational being given the 
various stages and adaptations that the being would pass through reach the end result. An 
exception is that the aliens could have been artificially designed into perfect rationality by 
another, advanced species, but that discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
If we assume that cooperation is necessary for an advanced society, then either they 
have evolved into fundamentally cooperative beings, or, if defection is likelier because of the 
neural circuitry, then this deficiency must be patched in some way or other for society to 
function. There is also the alternative of cooperation-inducing mechanisms. 
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Cooperation-inducing mechanisms 
Kinship 
The first line of defence against defection is shared genes. When asked if he’d save a 
brother from downing, evolutionary biologist J.B.S. Haldane jokingly said, “No, but I’d jump 
in the river for two brothers or eight cousins”. This is the essence of kin selection, the notion 
that one’s relatives also carries your genes, so that investing in them equals investing in your 
own genes’ proliferation (Hamilton, 1964a; Hamilton, 1964b). We see this in the case of the 
Nayar mercenaries mentioned earlier, where investing in their nephews and nieces was a viable 
solution to the illegitimacy of their wives’ children.  
Group augmentation 
After relatives, the next most important thing is the group. Cooperation within the group 
strengthens the group, further improving the animals’ chance of survival. Kokko, Johnstone, 
and Clutton-Brock (2001) have proposed that cooperative breeding, i.e. helping raise the 
children of unrelated others in your group, may improve fitness by augmenting the group. 
However, Clutton-Brock (2002) later argued that there appears to be no singular explanation 
for cooperative breeding, and that cooperative animal societies may show closer parallels to 
human society than previously thought. Depending on how large one considers one’s group, 
group augmentation would likely boost cooperation in species. A prevailing presumption in 
social psychology holds that in-group cohesion might also boost out-group hostility (Brewer, 
1999). However, Brewer (1999) have argued that in-group cohesion does not increase hostility 
towards other groups, it only increases the relative difference in attitude towards either.  
Punishment 
Other cooperation-inducing mechanisms are more generally applicable. If you can 
convince your partner that cheating will be paid for, then the treat alone might deter cheating. 
However, vengeance itself is expensive in terms of risking harm to oneself. Thus, having a 
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reputation as vengeful is helpful, but actually doing the avenging is not. In humans, enforcing 
costly punishment has been shown to both increase and decrease cooperation in prisoner’s 
dilemma (Wu et al. 2009). The cited research was done on both US and Chinese citizens, and 
the authors explain the discrepancy with cultural differences. Punishment of cheaters is found 
both among humans and other animals (e.g. Rohwer, 1977; Møller, 1987). Zhang, Li, De Silva, 
Bednarik and Sigmund (2014) have shown how a social contract to not cheat can emerge 
spontaneously. 
Morality 
In advanced enough species, and humans are the only species we know of that fits this 
description, individuals may have internal rules that govern prosocial behaviour. We call these 
rules morality, and they are special in that there is no inherent external punishment for not 
following them. Of course, laws are often built upon morality, obfuscating whether we chose 
a certain behaviour out of fear of punishment or because our morality demanded it. In choices 
of less consequence, however, morality do play a significant, albeit variable part, as humans 
are as wont to follow their morality as not (Lahti & Weinstein, 2005). A hypothesis put forward 
by Lahti and Weinstein (2005) holds that variability in moral adherence is due to the need to 
balance group cohesion and in-group competition. This makes it difficult to predict behaviour 
based on morality.  
Another problem with morality is its fluidity across cultures (e.g. Trompenaars, 2003) 
and social positions (Piff, Stancato, Côté, Mendoza-Denton, & Keltner, 2012). One culture’s 
moral may be to play nice and keep the peace, another’s could be to eradicate all unbelievers. 
This makes prediction behaviour from morality precariously close to guesswork.  
We have seen that, while cooperation in a species is not a given fact, there is ample 
reason to expect it in a species advanced enough to make contact across the stars. However, 
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could we make any assumptions about how they would view us? To answer this, we need to 
look at other species. 
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Cooperation between species 
Mutualism 
Interspecies interaction can take many forms. A useful way to categorise these 
interactions is to make a grid like the one in table 3. 
  Species 2 
  + - 0 
S
p
ec
ie
s 
1
 + Mutualism - - 
- 
Predation/ 
Parasitism 
Competition - 
0 Commensalism Amensalism Neutralism 
Table 3: Grid of interactions between species (Bronstein, 1994). 
 
We are mostly interested in mutualism, i.e. mutually beneficial interaction between 
different species. Note that while mutualism is sometimes used to mean intraspecies interaction 
(cooperation within a species), as well, this is not technically correct, as West, Griffin, and 
Gardner (2007) have pointed out. The most widely studied kind of mutualism is that between 
animals and plants (Bronstein, 1994), as pollination and seed dispersal are among the most 
readily observable mutualisms in nature. Others examples are the relationship between 
intestinal bacteria and humans (Bäckhed, Ley, Sonnenburg, Peterson, & Gordon, 2006), 
cleaner fish and their clients (Pinto et al., 2011), and the evolution of the eukaryotic cell, when 
free living bacteria entered a symbiotic relationship with prokaryotes (Margulis, 1981). 
Indirect reciprocity 
Kin selection, which likely is the root of much cooperation in the animal kingdom 
(Clutton-Brock, 2009), cannot possibly apply between different species. Indirect reciprocity, 
however, is possible. Eckardt and Zuberbühler (2004) found cooperation between two forest 
monkey species. It was hypothesised that their overlapping habitat and resource-use should 
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lead to competition, not cooperation, but apparently the weaker species was tolerated because 
it provided defence from eagles. Interspecies cooperation was most prevalent when food was 
abundant.  
Asymmetry  
A problem with interspecies cooperation is asymmetry, which generally hinders 
cooperation (Dawkins, 2010). There are several ways in which species can be asymmetric, 
including power and perspective.  
Power. Power is relatively straightforward, and differences in size, lethality, and tool-
use can easily make the species asymmetric. If this difference is large enough, it would 
presumable make any interaction highly one-sided. Gingins, Werminghausen, Johnstone, 
Grutter, and Bshary (2013) have used cleaner fish to show that power asymmetry can be offset 
if the weaker species is able to terminate cooperation at will, and if the stronger species has a 
low (but still existing) incentive to cheat.  
Perspective. By perspective we mean that the species world-view differs to a 
significant degree. Lifespan is a good example of perspective asymmetry. Long-term and short-
term are relative terms, so long-term for us might be short-term for a near-immortal species. 
While relative immortality could be construed as a difference in power, it would also likely 
entail different viewpoints. In fiction, immortal characters often portrayed as having a disregard 
mortal life, having no qualms about sacrificing lesser beings for the greater good. In Douglas 
Adams’ The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy, Earth is destroyed to make a hyperspatial 
express route through the solar system (Adams, 1979). While originally satirising bureaucracy, 
the situation also depicts differences in perspective. 
One problem of finding comparable interspecies cooperation with respect to longevity 
is that other factors also tend to be asymmetric. Take, for instance, man’s relation to insects. 
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While the difference in lifespan is just what we are looking for, other parameters are too 
dissimilar for meaningful comparison.  
Communication barrier 
 Tim Clutton-Brock (2009) has posited that the human ability to maintain cooperation 
with non-kin (with delayed rewards) and lack of cheating could be credited to language, more 
specifically the ability to make agreements regarding future payoffs and sanctions. Language 
also facilitates reputation, as it is no longer necessary to personally observe the making or 
breaking of a potential co-players reputation.  
Language is typically not shared across species; it is not even usually shared across 
cultures. This creates a potential stumbling block for cooperation. However, different 
civilisations have traded through the ages, and humans have trained animals to work for a 
reward of food later. Perhaps only a rudimentary signalling system is needed for cooperation 
to take place, at least if the cooperation is short-term. Long-term cooperation, on the other hand, 
likely requires more sophisticated communication.  
Empathy 
 Whether we feel empathy or antipathy towards someone depends in part on how fair 
we perceive them (Singer et al., 2006). In other words, this means empathy is conditional and 
not automatic; receivers of our empathy need to earn it first. Since emotional commitment to 
honesty hinges on empathy (Frank, 1988), then this is another challenge that interspecies 
cooperation needs to overcome. No small task without communication or shared culture.  
Oxytocin has been found to regulate social functions in many vertebrates (Miller, 
2010). It is, among other functions, known to strengthen empathic bonds between people, 
including their pets (Beetz, Uvnäs-Moberg, Julius, & Kotrschal, 2012). However, it also seems 
to strengthen out-group antipathy (De Dreu et al., 2010), and decreases adherence to fairness 
AN HONEST INVASION: A STUDY OF COOPERATION 46 
 
norms (Radke & de Bruijn, 2012). We would surely be the out-group to alien visitors, so if 
oxytocin or a similar hormone works the same for other advanced species, then their emotional 
commitment to honesty towards us seems uncertain at best.  
Cooperation?  
There is precedent for interspecies cooperation in nature, but there are a number of 
factors that makes it unlikely to happen on a regular basis. In the case of aliens and us, both 
power and perspective might differ to a large extent. First off, they have interstellar flight, 
suggesting powerful technology. This would presumably give them less incentive to cooperate 
with us, as the power balance tips in their favour.  
Secondly, there is the matter of perspective. Since we have already established their 
technological superiority, it is not a great leap of intuition to assume they could be in possession 
of great longevity, or even relative immortality. While no research on the topic can be found, 
understandably enough, we could make a case for our long-term goals being short-term for 
them. Why value a human life, spanning mere decades, compared to their millennia?  
There is also the issue of empathy. Humans only show empathy towards others 
deserving of it, making first impressions crucial. Even the hormone that causes parents to fall 
in love with their screaming new-borns have the additional effect of enhancing xenophobia. 
Since these functions are evolutionary beneficial, they are not unlikely to appear in similarly 
advanced species. 
Last, and perhaps least, is the issue of communication. There is a chance we would be 
able to communicate in a rudimentary fashion, after all, early traders managed it without any 
prior knowledge of distant languages. On the other hand, humans share fundamental 
uniformities that can be referenced when communicating. Pointing, facial expressions, 
signalling hunger by gesturing at the mouth or stomach, peace by displaying empty hands, to 
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name a few, are likely universally understood. On the other hand, there are many gestures that 
show no overlap between cultures (Poortinga, Schoots & Koppel, 1993). Likewise, there no 
guarantee that our aliens would be humanoid enough for even basic gestures to translate well.  
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Discussion 
This thesis has explored a wide range of mechanisms in the hopes of being able to 
predict behaviour in a theoretical way. This is useful when the luxury of observation is 
unavailable. There are many unknowns in the argument, and many presumptions, as it is 
impossible to be sure of even the most basic foundations of non-terrestrial life. However, based 
on what we do know is possible, we have constructed a scenario where some speculation can 
be attempted, independent of ecological or morphological variables.   
There are evidently many factors that could cause contact, and cooperation, between 
advanced species to not proceed optimally. Are there any factors that predict any other 
outcome? We have previously investigated emotional commitment to honesty and its role in 
guiding humanity towards long-term payoffs. However, we do not assume that this patch 
moderates behaviour against other species.  While not examined in this thesis, and not featuring 
too prominently in our history, humans also appear to have an emotional commitment against 
cruelty and injustice. This is relevant as it applies between at least some species, exemplified 
by our resistance to animal cruelty. As mentioned, empathy is at the core of emotional 
commitment to honesty, and it is likely that the same holds for cruelty.  We are very capable 
of performing atrocities, but we have to assume that performing them hurt initially, before 
getting accustomed to them. We can only hope this applies to similarly advanced intelligences 
as well, but there seems to be many barriers between mutual empathy.  
What if we landed on their planet? 
What if we reversed the scenario, that instead of the aliens landing on earth, humans 
landed on the alien homeworld? In that case, the power asymmetry might well be flipped, and 
we have the reverse scenario. The difference is that we know how humans generally act, so 
there is less speculation, and more a retrospective look on human history.  
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There is no shortage of evidence for what happens when civilisations meet cultures they 
don’t understand. The Spaniards decimated the Aztecs, the Americans forced the Native 
Americans into reservations and stole their lands, and in modern times, the Chinese occupied 
Tibet and killed as much as a fifth of the indigenous population (White, 2002), to name but a 
few.  
It could be argued that a large portion of indigenous genocide and repression was 
committed through ignorance. The Spaniards, for example, unwittingly carried with them 
diseases which effectively defeated the Aztecs for them (Crosby, 1967). It could also be argued 
that pre-modern humans did not understand that indigenous people were the same as them, or 
that they were capable of governing themselves. The white man’s burden, the imperative to 
bring culture and civilised values to peoples less fortunate than the white man, might 
conceivably have been founded on compassion, but the results were often eradication of 
culture, freedom, and lives. Perhaps rationalisation is a better explanation of white man’s 
burden, as there always seemed to be plenty of land and resources to be had in the invaded 
countries. Desmond Tutu once joked that “When the missionaries came to Africa they had the 
Bible and we had the land. They said "Let us pray." We closed our eyes. When we opened 
them, we had the Bible and they had the land” (Gish, 2004). 
So, while we have shown that humans possess emotional, in addition to rational, 
incentives to cooperate with each other, there is little precedence to suggest this would carry 
over to other, and in our eyes, inferior, creatures. We can always hope that rationality prevails, 
but while human evolution has been relatively swift (Wrangham & Peterson, 1996), we have 
not yet evolved away from the conquistadors.  
AN HONEST INVASION: A STUDY OF COOPERATION 51 
 
Possible sources of error 
Validity of prisoner’s dilemma. Prisoner’s dilemma and other public goods games are 
necessarily simplified versions of the games played in real life. The question is not how realistic 
the games are, but if they have ecological validity. Clements and Stephens (1995) have argued 
that there is no empirical justification for using prisoner’s dilemma is a basic paradigm for 
studying non-kin cooperation in animals. Clutton-Brock (2009) seems to echo this view. 
Dawkins (2010) have argued that the assumption of symmetry in prisoner’s dilemma is 
unrealistic in a natural setting. Moreover, since asymmetry appear to hinder cooperation, there 
is reason to doubt the validity of prisoner’s dilemma in studies of cooperation.  
Neuronal coding. While there is ample evidence for a logarithmic coding scheme, we 
found several alternative schemes have not yet been thoroughly examined. Reasons for this 
presumably range from their relative recent proposal, to the fact that it is difficult for new ideas 
to take root in academic soil (Campanario, 2002). Like MacKay (1963) posited in regard to 
whether coding were logarithmic or power-based, we can only get so far without examining 
the actual neural substrates.  
A potential problem with our literary review of neural coding is that we have been 
forced to take the authors’ words for why their evidence fits the particular model they argued 
for. We do not have the necessary mathematical foundation to do our own calculations, which 
is particularly troubling as some studies cited the same data, but with different conclusions. 
Moreover, it was beyond the scope of the thesis to do an exhaustive systematic literature 
review. However, we do maintain that the accumulated evidence points toward logarithmic 
rather than linear coding, but that more rigorous and exhaustive research is needed for a 
definitive answer.  
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We would like to address a curious pattern that emerged when examining the research 
on neural coding schemes. Although the published opinions favouring logarithmic coding of 
stimuli appear to be largely independent, we find that those in favour of linear coding all seem 
to have collaborated with John Gibbons, the originator of scalar expectancy theory, at some 
point. This might not mean much, but adding that to Wearden and Jones’ (2007) opinion that 
opposition to linear representation might be due to opposition to scalar expectancy theory, then 
we get the feeling that the debate has gotten personal. While this is largely speculation from 
our side, it does not make a strong case for linear coding’s objectivity.   
Frank’s golden opportunity. As Frank (1988) himself mentions, the existence of 
surveillance and “candid camera” makes even seemingly golden opportunities to cheat not 
worth the risk. There is simply no guarantee that you will not get caught. We do see, however, 
that birds will use these opportunities to cheat (Baltz & Clark, 1997), so something is evidently 
different between our species. It is possible that birds cannot conceive of an unseen watcher 
the way we can, yet there is no denying the emotional reaction opportunities to cheat elicit in 
us. Even if there is no such thing as a golden opportunity, there is such a thing as emotional 
commitment to honesty.  
Implications 
We have seen that the literature on neural coding have predominantly focused on linear 
and logarithmic coding schemes. We hope that this thesis have emphasised clearly that, while 
logarithmic coding is a viable scheme for neural representation of stimuli, and based on what 
research has been done to date, a probable one, it is not the only alternative. Coding based on 
modulo (Fiete et al. 2008), for example, seems a promising candidate, and Gallistel’s (2011) 
autoscaling function deserves more than a theoretical examination. 
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A missed opportunity of this thesis is the mathematical aspect. It is possible that a 
mathematical analysis of the arguments we have presented could have given more confident 
answers, rather than informed speculation. However, given the author’s qualifications, this 
proved beyond the scope of this thesis. A mathematical exploration of the foundations laid here 
could prove an interesting starting point for predictive models of advanced non-human 
intelligences.    
Relevance 
Psychology has always concerned itself with animal behaviour, human or otherwise. 
Knowing why something happens is the first step to predicting when it will happen, and how 
we can ensure that it does. This thesis has concerned itself with why cooperation happens in a 
universe where survival of the fittest is the rule everybody plays by. This should allow us to 
predict when cooperation breaks down, and which countermeasures can be taken to ensure it 
does not happen.  
Neural coding is important for our understanding of the brain, as well as artificial 
intelligence. Nature is a great place to borrow designs from, but the designs aren’t perfect. This 
is evident from the emotional commitment to honesty patch that Frank (1988) argued for. When 
designing an intelligence from the ground up, it would be useful to avoid quick-and-dirty fixes 
and ad hoc solutions.  
With regard to psychopathology, when things go wrong, it is presumably less likely to 
be a flaw in the fundamental workings of the brain, but rather a fault in higher functioning. The 
honesty patch seems a likelier target than the neural coding scheme. Impulsivity, which is 
fundamental in disorders like ADHD, Borderline, and substance-abuse, is closely linked with 
temporal discounting (Wittmann & Paulus, 2008), which again is linked with logarithmic 
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coding. The more precise our understanding of how we tick, the more precise our interventions 
can be.   
Lastly, while the focus of this thesis may come across as frivolous, it is none the less a 
scenario that, depending on who you ask, is likely to happen at some point or other. The 
universe is, to quote Douglas Adams, vastly hugely mind-bogglingly big, and already NASA 
have identified thousands of planets theoretically suitable for life (National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration, 2015). The main obstacle is the large distances involved, as crossing to 
the nearest galaxy, Alpha Centauri, would take almost five years travelling at the speed of light, 
and we are nowhere close to that speed yet. However, our hypothetical aliens might be.  
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Conclusion 
We asked if aliens would feel this emotional commitment to honesty. What we have 
seen is that, while cooperation is integral to human society, cooperation appears to have 
become prevalent in part due to an evolutionary patch, the emotional commitment to honesty. 
This was necessary, as the underlying neural coding scheme likely favours discounting future 
benefits, making long-term cooperation difficult. Other factors, like reputation and punishment, 
likewise incentivise cooperation, but strong temporal discounting keeps the balance in check. 
Since our tendency to cooperate is partly based on a quick fix, generalisation becomes difficult. 
However, budding civilisations would likely need some form of cooperation to achieve 
progress, so it is reasonable to assume that cooperation exists. It might be based on rationality 
rather than emotion, but the effect would likely be similar. There are also a handful of 
cooperation-inducing mechanisms that are likely to be in effect, including punishment and 
group enhancement.  
We also asked whether they would feel this commitment towards us, which is another 
matter entirely. There are many reasons for why cooperation should fall through, including 
communication barriers, asymmetric relationship between species, and lack of empathy. 
History also provides abundant examples of human non-cooperation with other species or 
cultures. In the end, it likely comes down to the cost-benefit ratio of partnership versus 
conquest.   
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